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Abstract 
When the choice of the nominal anchor of inflation stabilization is included in models of 
political business cycles, there is room for political opportunism of policymakers. The 
different business cycles associated with exchange rate-based (ERBS) and money-based 
stabilizations (MBS) imply that the decision regarding the timing and nominal anchor of 
stabilization may be affected by the timing of elections. Namely, an opportunistic 
policymaker is more likely to implement an ERBS than a MBS before elections, while the 
opposite happens after elections. Empirical results obtained when estimating a multinomial 
logit model for a sample of 35 stabilization programs implemented in chronic inflation 
countries clearly support this hypothesis. 
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1.  Introduction 
Contrary to the conventional wisdom that inflation stabilization has short-run 
contractionary effects, studies focusing on chronic inflation countries showed that exchange 
rate-based stabilization (ERBS) often leads to an initial expansion in economic activity, 
particularly in output and consumption, with the recession occurring later on. The short-run 
recessionary effects typically associated with disinflation tend to happen only in money-
based stabilizations (MBS). Thus, the choice of the nominal anchor can be interpreted as a 
choice between recession now and recession later. 
When the decision regarding the anchor of stabilization is included in models of 
political business cycles, there is room for political opportunism of policymakers. That is, the 
timing and the nominal anchor of stabilization may be affected by the timing of elections. 
Following Stein and Streb (1998) and Aisen (2002), we hypothesize that an opportunistic 
policymaker is more likely to implement an ERBS than a MBS before elections, while the 
opposite happens after elections. This hypothesis will be tested estimating a multinomial 
logit model for a sample of 35 stabilization programs implemented in chronic inflation 
countries since the late 1950s. The potential effects of initial economic conditions and of 
some political variables on the choice of the timing and nominal anchor of stabilization will 
also be considered. 
  The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the main findings of studies 
focusing on the real effects of the choice of the nominal anchor of stabilization. Section 3 
presents some political business cycles models and relates them to the choice of the nominal 
anchor. The data and the econometric model are described in section 4 and the empirical 
findings are presented in section 5. Finally, section 6 concludes the paper.  
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2.  Real effects of the choice of the nominal anchor of inflation stabilization 
Although inflation stabilization in low inflation economies is usually associated with 
significant short-run output costs, that is not necessarily the case for countries suffering from 
hyperinflation or chronic inflation.
1 Sargent (1982) argued that the hyperinflations of the 
1920s in Austria, Germany, Poland and Hungary were stopped with little or no output costs 
by using the exchange rate as the nominal anchor of stabilization. Végh (1992) analyses eight 
hyperinflations from 1922 to 1985 presenting further evidence that hyperinflations have been 
stopped almost immediately and with relatively small output costs following exchange rate-
based stabilization. 
  Kiguel and Leviatan (1992) and Végh (1992) showed that the relation between 
disinflation and output in chronic inflation countries depends of the nominal anchor of the 
stabilization program. Exchange rate-based stabilizations (ERBS) were generally associated 
with an initial expansion of output followed by a recession later on, while money-based 
stabilizations (MBS) would lead to an immediate recession and a recovery later on. Thus, 
when choosing the nominal anchor of stabilization a policymaker is also choosing the timing 
of recession and expansion: a MBS brings recession now, while an ERBS brings recession 
later. Calvo and Végh (1999) find evidence in favor of this “recession-now-versus-recession-
later” hypothesis using a sample of 14 stabilizations (9 ERBS and 5 MBS) implemented in 8 
chronic inflation countries.
2 
                                                 
1 Hyperinflation corresponds to a monthly inflation rate of at least 50%, and tends to have a short duration 
(sometimes, just a few months). Chronic inflation is a situation of high inflation relative to that of industrial 
countries that lasts for a long period of time (for several years). 
2 Hoffmaister and Végh (1996) test this hypothesis for Uruguay using VAR estimations and also find evidence 
in favor of the “recession-now-versus-recession-later” hypothesis. See Rebelo and Végh (1995) for a study on 
the real effects of exchange rate-based stabilizations.  
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  A dissenting view is presented by Easterly (1996) and Hamann (2001), who find 
stabilization to be expansionary, regardless of the nominal anchor used. The different results 
obtained may be due to the different methodology used to construct the sample. While the 
present paper and those referred to in the paragraphs above follow the so-called “episodic” 
approach, selecting the stabilizations that have received greater attention in the literature, 
Easterly (1996) and Hamann (2001) follow the “mechanical” approach. That is, they identify 
stabilizations according to a mechanical rule for the behavior of inflation. The result is a very 
different sample, including many more countries but that excludes several unsuccessful 
stabilizations that took place in chronic inflation countries.
3 
  Another dissenting view is presented by Gould (1999), who argues that after 
adjusting for initial conditions the choice of the nominal anchor becomes endogenous and 
growth improves regardless of the anchor used. Countries with an ample stock of 
international reserves, higher inflation-fighting credibility, and better prospects for economic 
growth (growth above trend) can implement exchange rate-based stabilizations, while 
countries that lack these characteristics are left with money-based stabilizations. Thus, ERBS 
are implemented in good times and MBS are implemented in bad times. Following the 
episodic approach of sample construction, Gould (1999: 3) finds that “after controlling for 
the level of international reserves and inflation, growth after monetary-based stabilizations 
does not differ significantly from growth following exchange rate-based stabilizations.” 
                                                 
3 These results are contradicted by Fisher, Sahay, and Végh (2002), who use a somewhat mechanical approach 
to define a sample of 27 stabilizations following 45 episodes of very high inflation that took place in 25 
countries. They find that the expansionary effects of stabilization are due essentially to the ERBS present in 
their sample. That is, the ERBS lead to an initial boom in output and consumption, while the non-ERBS (MBS 
and those that defy a clear classification) are not expansionary.  
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3.  Political Business Cycles and the choice of the nominal anchor 
The different business cycles generated by ERBS and MBS, combined with the 
electoral cycles of democratic regimes may give rise to an opportunistic behavior of 
politicians regarding the choice of the nominal anchor of stabilization. That is, in a situation 
of high inflation, when a stabilization program is clearly necessary, the choice of the nominal 
anchor may depend of the current phase of the electoral cycle. For example, a politician 
seeking reelection may not be interested in implementing a MBS shortly before an election 
because the recession it causes could lead to a loss of votes. In contrast, an ERBS could make 
the policymaker look more competent in the eyes of the electorate and help win the elections. 
Thus, an opportunistic politician would prefer to implement an ERBS shortly before 
elections and a MBS after elections. 
  This opportunistic behavior can be justified by the political business cycle literature.
4 
The best-known model is due to Nordhaus (1975), who assumed a stable Phillips curve, 
adaptative expectations, retrospective behavior of voters, and opportunistic policymakers. In 
this setting, the incumbent would stimulate the economy toward the end of his/her term in 
order to appear more competent and win the elections. The resulting higher inflation before 
elections would be reduced with restrictive policies after the elections. Thus, one would 
observe high growth and low unemployment before elections and a recession after them. 
  Rogoff and Sibert (1988) developed a rational expectations model in which the ability 
of parties to generate favorable economic outcomes differs. Since knowledge of ability is 
private information, competency cannot be observed directly by the electorate. Thus, 
politicians try to appear as competent as possible and lead to political business cycles. But, 
voter’s rationality and knowledge of politicians’ incentives make these political business 
                                                 
4 For a survey on this literature see Person and Tabellini (2000).  
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cycles smaller in magnitude, shorter-lived, and less regular than in Nordhaus’ (1975) model. 
In Alesina and Cukierman (1990), voters are not fully informed about the incumbent’s 
preferences and do not observe his/her policy actions directly. However, since policy 
outcomes are positively correlated with policy actions, they convey information about the 
incumbent’s preferences. Therefore, the assumption of persistence of preferences implies that 
voters can draw inferences about future policies and outcomes by looking at current 
economic conditions. Again, there is an incentive to generate political business cycles. 
  Harrington (1993) combines the two above-mentioned models by assuming that 
voters are uncertain about the effectiveness of policy actions, the incumbent’s future policy 
intentions, and which policy the incumbent believes it is best. Voters’ preferences are 
endogenous and may change as new information is released. In such a setting, the electorate 
will be more sensitive to policy actions (as in Rogoff and Sibert, 1988) when it feels more 
confident about which policy is best, or more able to identify the consequences of policy 
actions. Voting behavior will be more performance-based (as in Alesina and Cukierman, 
1990) when voters are more uncertain about the effectiveness of the policies chosen. 
  Stein and Streb (1998) developed a competency model for high inflation economies 
based on performance-based voting behavior. In their model, inflation reduction with low 
output costs signals competency of the government. Given the business cycles associated 
with the choice of the nominal anchor of stabilizations, the absence of short-run costs of 
higher unemployment and lower growth provide strong incentives for policymakers to reduce 
inflation before elections by implementing exchange rate-based stabilizations. Aisen (2002) 
finds evidence of this opportunistic behavior regarding the choice of the nominal anchor of 
stabilization. His results show that ERBS are on average implemented before elections, while 
MBS are started after them.  
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4.  The data and the econometric model 
The previous sections imply that when the decision regarding the choice of the 
nominal anchor of inflation stabilization in chronic inflation countries is incorporated in 
models of political business cycles, there is a tendency for opportunistic behavior of 
policymakers, expressed in the implementation of exchange rate-based stabilizations before 
elections and money-based stabilizations after elections. The existence of this effect of the 
timing of elections on the choice of the nominal anchor and on the timing of inflation 
stabilization is the main hypothesis that will be tested in the present paper. 
For that purpose we constructed a dataset composed of quarterly data from the first 
quarter of 1957 to the fourth quarter of 1999, for 10 countries that experienced chronic 
inflation and implemented stabilization programs during this period. The first major issue to 
solve when constructing the dataset was to determine when a stabilization program had been 
implemented. The method consisted in searching the economics literature for information on 
the starting dates of stabilization programs undertaken in countries suffering from chronic 
inflation. The 44 stabilizations identified are described in table 1, where the quarter of 
implementation, the type, and the main reference for each program are also indicated. 
 
<< Insert Table 1 around here >> 
 
Since we are interested in testing whether the electoral cycle affects the choice of the 
nominal anchor and the timing of stabilization, only the programs whose implementation was 
preceded and followed by elections are included in the sample. These are the ones whose 
date/name appears in bold in the second column of table 1. That is, the nine programs 
implemented during dictatorships or followed by dictatorships (instead of elections) are 
excluded. Thus, the sample used in the estimations includes 35 stabilizations, 29 ERBS and 6  
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MBS, implemented in eight countries. We will also perform estimations on a restricted 
sample of “Major Stabilization Programs,” that is, those that received greater attention in the 
literature. Table 2 describes the 23 major programs identified, with those that occurred 
between elections, the 15 included in the restricted sample, indicated in bold. 
 
<< Insert Table 2 around here >> 
 
Considering that it makes more sense to test for the probability of implementing a 
stabilization program when it is clearly necessary, we decided to use the quarters of high 
inflation as our baseline sample. Thus, the second major issue to solve when constructing the 
sample was to determine when inflation was “high”. Following Veiga (2000), inflation was 
considered high when it was over twice the average inflation rate of the last 10 years (and 
above 25%) or greater than or equal to 100%. 
Before choosing the appropriate econometric model it was necessary to identify the 
alternative decisions a policymaker could take in each quarter. We assumed that, in a 
situation of high inflation, the policymaker could do one of the following: (1) start an 
exchange rate-based stabilization (ERBS); (2) start a money-based stabilization (MBS); or 
postpone the necessary stabilization program (NS – no stabilization). Since there are three 
alternatives, the econometric model chosen was the Multinomial Logit.
5 
In our opinion, this model is preferable to the probit specification of Aisen (2002), 
who estimates the effect of several variables on the probability of implementing an ERBS 
instead of a MBS, assuming that the decision to start a stabilization program was taken 
previously. First, we think that it is not correct to assume that the decision to stabilize 
                                                 
5 This econometric model was also chosen by Gould (1999).  
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precedes the choice of the nominal anchor. An opportunistic policymaker will always 
compare the political advantages of implementing an ERBS to those of starting a MBS or not 
stabilizing, which means that the decision to stabilize is taken simultaneously with the choice 
of the anchor. Unless the costs of inflation are unbearable, it does not make sense to commit 
to a stabilization program before knowing whether an ERBS or a MBS are preferable to not 
stabilizing. Second, as shown by Veiga (2000) the timing of stabilizations is strongly affected 
by political variables. It is quite possible that it is also affected by the timing of elections, 
which means that Aisen’s (2002) assumption that the inflationary history of the country will 
determine the exact moment to launch the nominal anchor to stabilize inflation may be an 
exaggerated simplification of reality. By allowing the policymaker the option of not 
stabilizing, our model also estimates the effects of the electoral cycle and of other factors on 
the timing of stabilization.
 6 
The multinomial logit model
7 describes the probability that certain event j will occur, 
which is determined by a set of attributes or characteristics included in vector Xi. The 
estimated equations supply a set of probabilities for J+1 choices. In the present case there are 
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6 The results shown in Table 4 clearly show that, even controlling for inflation and other variables, the 
probability of implementing a MBS versus not stabilizing (NS) decreases as the next elections come closer. 
Thus, the timing of stabilizations is affected by the electoral cycle. 
7 For a more complete description of this model see Greene (2000) and Long (1997).  
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where STAB, the dependent variable, equals 2 for an ERBS, 1 for a MBS, and zero if no 
stabilization is implemented (NS). This model can also be expressed in terms of the odds. 
The odds of outcome j versus outcome k are equal to: 
  .
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In the context of the present study, the difference  2 1 β − β , called a contrast, is the effect of 
the independent variable X on the logit of outcome 1 (MBS) versus outcome 2 (ERBS). If 
one of the independent variables changes by one unit (for instance Xk), we may interpret this 
change in terms of an odds ratio, i.e. the ratio of the odds before and after the change in Xk. 
This effect will be equal to  k j e
β − β
. Thus, in this study, the odds ratio can be interpreted as 
follows: for a unit change in Xk, the odds are expected to change by a factor of  2 1 β − β e , 
holding all other variables constant.
8 
The multinomial logit model is estimated by maximum likelihood. The log-likelihood 
can be derived by defining, for each individual, dij=1 if alternative j is chosen by individual i, 
and 0 if not, for the J+1 possible choices. The log-likelihood is a generalization of that for 
the binomial logit model: 






i ij j STAB d L
10
) ( Prob log log .       (3) 
Maximizing (3) in order to  j β  we obtain the maximum likelihood estimates. Since we are 
considering three possible choices, the number of estimated coefficients is twice that of the 
binary logit model. 
The dependent variable and all independent variables are described in table 3. The 
explanatory variables used in our baseline model are the following: 
                                                 
8 See Long (1997: 169) for the interpretation of the odds ratios.  
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•  PCR - Political Cycle Ratio: number of quarters since the last elections divided by the 
number of quarters to the next elections;
9 
•  Frag - Fragmentation of the political system: dummy variable that takes the value of 
one if there is a one-party majority parliamentary government or a presidential 
government, with the same party in control of the parliament. Frag takes the value of 
zero for more fragmented political systems; 








Ind F ,   where pi = percentage of seats of party i. 
•  TR/Imp – Ratio of Total Reserves to Imports; 
•  Inf – Inflation rate: growth of CPI since the same quarter of the previous year; 
•  GDP>T - GDP growth above the trend growth rate: dummy variable that takes the 
value of one if the growth rate of real GDP since the same quarter of the previous 
year is greater than the Trend (Hodrick-Prescott) growth rate of GDP, and takes the 
value of zero otherwise. 
•  FB/GDP - Fiscal Balance (Government Budget Balance) as a percentage of GDP; 
•  IMFProg – Presence of an IMF program: dummy variable that equals one if there is 
an ongoing arrangement with the IMF, and equals zero otherwise. 
 
<< Insert Table 3 around here >> 
 
                                                 
9 Only the presidential elections are considered in presidential systems and only the legislative elections are 
considered in parliamentary systems (Israel and Turkey).  
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  Since a MBS leads to a recession in the short run, a politician who wishes to be re-
elected will not adopt it just before an election. Instead, this would be the ideal occasion to 
implement an ERBS since its expansive effects, together with the reduction of the inflation 
rate, would increase the policymaker’s popularity and help him/her win the elections. Thus, 
we expect PCR to have a negative coefficient for the contrasts MBS/NS and MBS/ERBS, 
and a positive coefficient for the contrast ERBS/NS. 
  According to Veiga (2000), greater political fragmentation delays stabilizations. 
Thus, we expect Frag to have a positive coefficient and F.Ind to have a negative coefficient 
for the contrasts MBS/NS and ERBS/NS, since lower fragmentation would increase the 
probability of implementing a stabilization program. Although Aisen (2002) argues that a 
MBS requires greater political cohesion than an ERBS, we think that it is required in both 
cases. Thus, we do not expect significant effects of political fragmentation on the choice of 
the nominal anchor. 
  Gould (1999) argues that the choice of the anchor depends of the initial economic 
conditions. More precisely, low growth relative to trend, low stock of international reserves 
and high inflation would favor the implementation of a MBS instead of an ERBS. These 
hypotheses lead to the expectation of a positive coefficient for Inf and negative coefficients 
for TR/IMP and GDP>T for the contrasts MBS/ERBS and MBS/NS. When considering the 
contrast ERBS/NS, we expect positive coefficients for the three variables.
10 
  The fiscal balance as a percentage of GDP (FB/GDP) and the existence of an ongoing 
IMF program/arrangement (IMFProg) are not directly related to the models referred to in 
sections 2 and 3. Nevertheless, it is possible that they affect the timing and the choice of the 
                                                 
10 A positive coefficient is expected for Inf because higher inflation increases the probability of implementing a 
stabilization program regardless of the nominal anchor (see Veiga, 2000).  
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nominal anchor of stabilization. For this reason, they will be included in the estimations as 
control variables. 
 
5.  Empirical results 
Table 4 presents the baseline results of the multinomial logit estimations. As already 
said above, we assume that, in a situation of high inflation, the policymaker can do one of the 
following: start a money-based stabilization (MBS); start an exchange rate-based 
stabilization (ERBS); or not stabilizing (NS). Given these three alternatives, results are 
presented for the contrasts MBS versus NS, ERBS versus NS, and MBS versus ERBS. It is 
the latter that is of greater interest to this article since it tells us which factors affect the 
choice of one nominal anchor instead of the other. Most economic variables are lagged one 
period in order to avoid simultaneity problems and to account for the usual delays in the 
report of economic data. For each estimated coefficient, the factor changes in the odds ratios, 
the t-statistics, and the marginal effects of changes in the independent variables are also 
indicated. Finally, the logarithm of the likelihood function, the Schwartz Bayesian 
Information Criterion (SBIC), the McFadden R
2, and the number of observations and 
stabilizations are reported. 
 
<< Insert Table 4 around here >> 
 
  The political cycle ratio (PCR) is statistically significant for the first and last 
contrasts, indicating (as expected) that the probability of adopting a MBS decreases (relative 
to NS and to ERBS) as elections come closer.
11 These results clearly support our main 
                                                 
11 In terms of odds ratios, we can see that for the contrast MBS/ERBS in column 1 a unit change in PCR leads 
to an expected change of the odds by a factor of 0.1295, ceteris paribus.  
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hypothesis and are consistent with the opportunistic behavior of policymakers found by 
Aisen (2002) and with Stein and Streb’s (1998) model.  
  The fragmentation of the political system (Frag) does not seem to affect any of the 
contrasts (column 1) and the fragmentation index of the distribution of seats in Parliament 
(F.Ind) is statistically significant only for the contrast ERBS/NS (column 2). This implies 
that greater fragmentation does not affect the choice of the nominal anchor but reduces the 
probability of implementing an ERBS versus not stabilizing. This result is consistent with 
Veiga (2000) that found that greater political fragmentation reduced the probability of 
implementing a stabilization program in a situation of high inflation, and helped explain the 
delays of stabilizations found in many chronic inflation countries.
12 
  The ratio of total reserves to imports (TR/Imp) is statistically significant in all but one 
estimation. As expected, a greater stock of reserves reduces the probability of choosing a 
MBS relative to an ERBS or to not stabilizing. In the results of column 2, it also increases the 
probability of implementing an ERBS relative to not stabilizing. These results are consistent 
with Gould’s (1999) argument that a higher level of reserves would lead to the adoption of an 
ERBS, while the lack of them would favor the adoption of a MBS. 
  The inflation rate (Inf) is also statistically significant in all but one estimation (the 
last). As in Veiga (2000), greater inflation increases the probability of implementing an 
inflation stabilization program, regardless of the nominal anchor. In column 1, greater 
inflation also seems to favor the adoption of a MBS instead of an ERBS, as suggested by 
Gould (1999). 
  Whether GDP growth is above the trend growth rate (GDP>T) or not, does not seem 
to affect the adoption of a stabilization program nor the choice of its nominal anchor. This 
                                                 
12 The lack of a similar result for MBS may be due to the very small number of observations (just 6).  
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result contradicts Gould (1999) that argued that growth above trend would favor the adoption 
of an ERBS versus a MBS. 
  The fiscal balance as a percentage of GDP (FB/GDP) does not seem to affect the 
choice of the nominal anchor. It is statistically significant only for the contrast ERBS/NS, 
indicating that a greater budget surplus (deficit) decreases (increases) the probability of 
implementing an ERBS. This may be due to the fact that many episodes of high inflation 
started with large budget deficits that were monetized. Thus, it is not strange that there is a 
budget deficit when an ERBS starts. 
  Finally, the existence of an ongoing IMF program/arrangement (IMFProg) seems to 
favor the adoption of a MBS versus an ERBS and versus not stabilizing (NS). This may be 
due to the fact that IMF arrangements generally imply restrictions of domestic credit and of 
money supply growth, which are more consistent with a MBS. Furthermore, an empirical 
regularity of ERBS is that they lead to the deterioration of the trade balance and current 
account balance (see Calvo and Végh, 1999: 1546), which generally aggravates the balance 
of payments disequilibria that IMF programs wish to fight. 
  Tables 5.A and 5.B, present the results of a series of robustness tests for the contrast 
MBS/ERBS, using this sample of high inflation periods. The results of these 10 alternative 
estimations are consistent with those of table 4. In columns 1 and 2 we used real GDP growth 
(GDP) and the deviation from trend of real GDP (GDPdT) instead of GDP>T. These 
variables are not statistically significant, indicating again that the implementation of a 
stabilization program and the choice of its nominal anchor are not affected by GDP. In 
column 3, the dummy variable Right, that equals one for a right or center-right government, 
is included in order to account for partisan effects. Since rightist governments tend to care 
less about growth and unemployment than left-wing ones (see Hibbs, 1977), the result that 
they are more prone to implement a MBS makes sense. But, there is no evidence that the  
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long run costs of MBS are different to those of ERBS, which means that when long run 
welfare effects are considered, the political orientation of the government should not affect 
the choice of the nominal anchor of stabilization. In columns 4 and 5, two alternative 
variables for IMF support are used. Both the total Fund credit and loans outstanding as a 
percentage of imports (TFC/Imp) and the duration of IMF support (Dur_aid) are not 
statistically significant, meaning that the amount of credit and its duration may not affect the 
choice of the nominal anchor of stabilization. 
 
<< Insert Table 5.A around here >> 
 
When the deviation from trend of total reserves (TRdT) is used instead of TR/Imp 
there is still evidence that more reserves favor the implementation of an ERBS (column 6 – 
table 5.B). This regression also indicates that GDP growth above trend (GDP>T) favors the 
implementation of a MBS (which contradicts Gould, 1999) and that the existence of an IMF 
program (IMFProg) does not matter for the choice of the nominal anchor. Columns 7 to 10 
show the results of estimations that use alternative indicators of the timing of elections. Of 
these, only the number of quarters to the next elections (QNE) is statistically significant. As 
expected, the farther away from the next elections, the more likely is a MBS to be 
implemented instead of an ERBS. 
 
<< Insert Table 5.B around here >> 
 
  All the models referred to above were estimated for a sample containing all 
observations, that is, a sample that also includes the quarters in which inflation was not high 
according to our definition. Results, presented in table 6, show that all indicators of the  
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timing of elections are statistically significant and have the expected signs. That is, all 
provide further evidence that shortly after elections there is a greater probability of 
implementing a MBS versus an ERBS, while the opposite happens shortly before elections. 
There is also weak evidence that a greater degree of fragmentation in Parliament leads to the 
implementation of a MBS (F.Ind is marginally significant in most estimations), but this result 
is not consistent across the several tables of results included in this article. 
 
<< Insert Table 6 around here >> 
 
  Sensitivity analysis to changes in the sample is presented in table 7. In column 1, 
Israel and Turkey were excluded, so that we could see whether results changed when only 
Latin American countries were considered. The only change relative to the last estimation of 
table 4 is that IMFProg is no longer statistically significant. Since there is no consensus on 
the classification of the Bolivian stabilization of 1985:3, we decided to check whether results 
change when it is classified as a MBS, as Ágenor and Montiel (1999) do. Results, shown in 
columns 2 and 3, present clear evidence in favor of opportunistic behavior of policymakers, 
as  PCR and PCR2 are statistically significant and have the expected signs.
13 They also 
indicate that a lower stock of reserves, higher inflation and the existence of an IMF program 
favor the adoption of a MBS relative to an ERBS. Finally, some authors argue that Bolivia is 
not a chronic inflation country, since inflation did not persist for many years and reached 
hyperinflation levels relatively fast. Thus, according to this view, Bolivia should be excluded 
from the sample. That was done in the estimations of columns 4 and 5, whose results are very 
similar to those of columns 2 and 3. Thus, the major change in results observed when we 
                                                 
13 As described in table 3, the difference between PCR and PCR2 is that the latter also considers legislative 
elections in presidential regimes.  
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classify the Bolivian stabilization of 1985:3 as a MBS or exclude Bolivia from the sample is 
that there is greater evidence that higher inflation increases the probability of adopting a 
MBS versus an ERBS. 
 
<< Insert Table 7 around here >> 
 
Finally, all the above-referred estimations were performed for a sample containing 
only the “major stabilization programs” listed in table 2. These are the programs that 
received greater attention from the literature. Table 8.A shows the results for the 3 contrasts. 
The major differences relative to table 4 (when all programs were considered) are that the 
fiscal balance (FB/GDP) and the existence of an IMF program (IMFProg) are never 
statistically significant. The major conclusions regarding what affects the implementation of 
a stabilization program and the choice of its nominal anchor remain essentially the same. The 
results of the sensitivity analysis, similar to that of table 7, are shown in table 8.B. Although 
PCR is not statistically significant in columns 2 and 4, PCR2 is highly statistically significant 
in columns 3 and 5, providing evidence in favor of opportunistic behavior. It is possible that 
the smaller t-statistics associated with PCR are due to the smaller number of stabilizations. 
The other difference relative to table 7 is that IMFProg is no longer statistically significant 
and has the opposite sign. Thus, it seems that IMF support did not affect the choice of the 
nominal anchor of the “major stabilization programs.” 
 
<< Insert Tables 8.A and 8.B around here >> 
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6.  Conclusions 
There is clear evidence of opportunistic behavior of policymakers regarding the 
timing of stabilization and, especially, the choice of the nominal anchor. Empirical results 
show that a money-based stabilization (MBS) is more likely to be implemented shortly after 
elections, while the probability of adopting an exchange rate-based stabilization (ERBS) is 
greater shortly before elections. The theoretical justification of these empirical findings is 
clear when the “recession-now-versus-recession-later” hypothesis is integrated in political 
business cycles models that assume information asymmetry. An opportunistic policymaker 
would implement an ERBS before elections because it reduces inflation and creates a boom 
at the same time, which makes the incumbent look more competent in the eyes of the 
electorate (see Stein and Streb, 1998). Since a MBS generates an immediate recession, it 
should be implemented shortly after elections, so that the recovery that follows later on takes 
place before the end of the incumbent’s current term. Furthermore, except for the cases in 
which the incumbent was reelected, his/her predecessor may be blamed for the costs of 
stabilization. 
The fact that the evidence of opportunistic behavior is found after controlling for 
initial economic conditions (the lagged economic variables) contradicts Gould’s (1999) 
argument that after controlling for these the choice of the nominal anchor becomes 
endogenous. Nevertheless, it is true that initial conditions also affect the choice between 
ERBS and MBS. As Gould (1999) argued, the probability of implementing a MBS versus an 
ERBS is greater when the stock of international reserves is lower and inflation is higher. 
However, there is no evidence that a MBS is more likely to be adopted when real GDP 
growth is bellow trend. 
Empirical results provide weak evidence that a MBS is more likely to be adopted 
during the implementation of an arrangement with the IMF. Although financial aid from the  
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IMF would decrease the costs of inflation stabilization regardless of the anchor, an ERBS is 
generally associated with real exchange rate appreciation and deteriorating external accounts, 
which aggravate the balance of payments problems the IMF whishes to solve. Furthermore, 
IMF arrangements are generally associated with restrictions to domestic credit and money 
supply growth, which are consistent with a money-based stabilization.  Thus, it seems 
plausible that a MBS would be preferable during an IMF arrangement. 
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Table 1: Stabilization Programs 







1985:2 (Austral I) 
1986:3 (Primavera I) 
1987:1 (February) 
1987:4 (Austral II) 


















Kiguel and Leviatan (1988) 
Kiguel and Leviatan (1992) 
Kiguel and Leviatan (1992) 
Kiguel and Leviatan (1992) 
Kiguel and Leviatan (1988) 
Kiguel and Leviatan (1992) 
Kiguel and Leviatan (1991) 
Kiguel and Leviatan (1991) 
Kiguel and Leviatan (1991) 
Kiguel and Leviatan (1991) 
Kiguel and Leviatan (1991) 
Heyman (1991) 
Calvo and Vegh (1999) 












Morales (1988), Végh (1992) 














Calvo and Vegh (1999) 
Kiguel and Leviatan (1991) 
Kiguel and Leviatan (1991) 
Kiguel and Leviatan (1991) 
Kiguel and Leviatan (1991) 
Calvo and Vegh (1999) 
Ágénor and Montiel (1999) 




Calvo and Vegh (1999) 
Calvo and Vegh (1999) 
Dominican Republic  1990:3  MBS  Calvo and Vegh (1999) 
Israel 1980:4  (Aridor  I) 
1982:3 (Aridor II) 
1983:4 (Cohen-Orgad) 
1984:3 (Package Deal I) 
1984:4 (Package Deal II) 




















Diaz and Tercero (1988) 





Agénor and Montiel (1999) 









Hoffmaister and Vegh (1996) 
Calvo and Vegh (1999) 
Calvo and Vegh (1999) 
Calvo and Vegh (1999) 
Turkey  1980:1 MBS  Rodrik  (1991) 
Note:  - ERBS – Exchange Rate-Based Stabilization; MBS – Money-Based Stabilization. 
- The programs whose date/name appears in bold were implemented during election cycles. 
The others were implemented during dictatorships or followed by dictatorships.  
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Table 2: Major Stabilization Programs 
 















Bolivia 1985:3  ERBS 












Dominican Republic  1990:3  MBS 
Israel 1985:3  (Shekel)  ERBS 
Mexico 1987:4  ERBS 









Turkey  1980:1 MBS 
Sources: see table 1. 
Notes:   - ERBS = Exchange Rate-Based Stabilization; 
- MBS = Money-Based Stabilization. 
- The programs whose date/name appears in bold were 
implemented during election cycles. The others were 
implemented during dictatorships or followed by 
dictatorships.  
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Table 3: Description of the Variables Used 
Dependent variable: 
STAB   = 0  if no stabilization program (NS) is implemented in the current quarter,  
= 1  if a Money-Based Stabilization (MBS) is implemented, and 
= 2  if an Exchange Rate-Based Stabilization (ERBS) is implemented. 
Independent political variables: 
PCR - Political Cycle Ratio: number of quarters since the last elections divided by the number of quarters to 
the next elections (presidential, in presidential systems; and legislative, in parliamentary systems).  
PCR2 - Equal to PCR, except for the fact that parliamentary elections are also considered for countries that 
have a presidential system (all except Israel and Turkey). 
QNE – Number of quarters to the next elections (presidential, in presidential systems; and legislative, in 
parliamentary systems). 
QLE – Number of quarters since the last elections (presidential, in presidential systems; and legislative, in 
parliamentary systems). 
ELY = 1 if the last elections (presidential, in presidential systems; and legislative, in parliamentary systems) 
occurred in the last year, and =0 otherwise. 
Frag =1 if there is a one-party majority parliamentary government or a presidential government, with the 
same party in control of the parliament (with an overall majority) , and =0 for more fragmented 
political systems. 






2 , where pi  = percentage of seats of party i. 
Right = 1 for a right or center-right oriented government, and =0 otherwise. 
Independent Economic variables: 
TR/Imp – Ratio of Total Reserves to Imports. 
TRdT – Percentage deviation from Trend (Hodrick-Prescott) of Total Reserves. 
Inf – Growth of CPI since the same quarter of the previous year. 
GDP>T  =1 if the growth of real GDP since the same quarter of the previous year is greater than the Trend 
(Hodrick-Prescott) growth rate of GDP. 
GDP - Growth of Real GDP since the same quarter of the previous year. 
GDPdT – Percentage deviation from trend (Hodrick-Prescott) of real GDP. 
FB/GDP - Fiscal Balance (Government Budget Balance) as a percentage of GDP. 
IMFProg = 1 if there is an ongoing IMF program (arrangement), and =0 otherwise. 
TFC/IMP - Total Fund (IMF) Credit and loans outstanding as a percentage of Imports. 
Dur_aid – Duration of IMF financial support (number of quarters). 
Sources: 
-  Dependent variable: see table 1. 
-  Political variables: Arthur Banks, ed., Political Handbook of the World, several issues; Gorvin (1989); 
Haggard and Kaufman (1992); McDonald and Ruhl (1989); Mainwaring and Scully (1995);World 
Europa Yearbook, Europa, several issues. 
-  Economic variables: International Financial Statistics - IMF. Quarterly data on Real GDP was also 
obtained from IBGE (Brazil) and INEGI (Mexico). Data on the timing of IMF arrangements was 
obtained from the IMF Annual Report (several issues) and on the IMF web page 
(http://www.imf.org).  
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Table 4: Timing and choice of the nominal anchor of stabilization programs 
1 2   
MBS/NS ERBS/NS  MBS/ERBS  MBS/NS ERBS/NS  MBS/ERBS 




































   




































































































































Log Likelihood  -81.5082  -80.5805 
Schwarz B.I.C.  123.096  122.168 
McFadden R
2 0.2231  0.2320 
No. Observations  181  181 
No. MBS  6  6 
No. ERBS  29  29 
Sources: see tables 1 and 3. 
Notes:  
•  The factor changes in the odds ratios are between “<>”;  
•  t-Statistics are in parentheses;  
•  Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%;  
•  The marginal effects, in percentages ((dP/dX)*100), are in brackets;  
•  Models estimated with a constant, by maximum likelihood (ML). 
•  MBS – Money-Based Stabilization; ERBS – Exchange Rate-Based Stabilization; NS – No Stabilization.  
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Table 5.A: Robustness tests for high inflation periods – I 
 
MBS/ERBS 1 2 3 4 5 




















Right     2.68018 
(2.04)** 
  


























GDP(-1)  -0.010870 
(-0.10) 
    
GDPdT(-1)   -0.024002 
(-0.24) 
   



















TFC/Imp (-1)      -0.371122 
(-0.50) 
 
Dur_aid       0.200650 
(1.20) 
Log  Likelihood -80.9719 -81.1585 -78.2985 -79.2108 -81.3756 
Schwarz  B.I.C. 122.560 122.746 125.085 120.799 122.964 
McFadden R
2  0.2282 0.2265 0.2537 0.2450 0.2244 
No.  Observations  181 181 181 181 181 
No.  MBS  6 6 6 6 9 
No.  ERBS  29 29 29 29 26 
Sources: see tables 1 and 3. 
Notes:  
•  t-Statistics are in parentheses;  
•  Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%;  
•  Models estimated with a constant, by maximum likelihood (ML). 
•  Only the results of the contrast MBS|ERBS are shown. 
•  MBS – Money-Based Stabilization; ERBS – Exchange Rate-Based Stabilization. 
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Table 5.B: Robustness tests for high inflation periods – II 
 
MBS/ERBS 6 7 8 9  10 
PCR  -2.07722 
(-2.16)** 
    
PCR2   -0.883161 
(-1.59) 
   
QNE     0.115330 
(1.71)* 
  
QLE      -0.179273 
(-1.46) 
 
ELY       1.55280 
(1.34) 


















TRdT(-1)  -0.033335 
(-1.76)* 
    








































Log  Likelihood -83.1286 -82.5444 -80.6657 -82.1633 -82.7766 
Schwarz  B.I.C. 124.717 124.264 122.254 123.751 124.365 
McFadden R
2  0.2077 0.2180 0.2312 0.2169 0.2110 
No.  Observations  181 184 181 181 181 
No.  MBS  6 6 6 6 6 
No.  ERBS  29 29 29 29 29 
Sources: see tables 1 and 3. 
Notes:  
•  t-Statistics are in parentheses;  
•  Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%;  
•  Models estimated with a constant, by maximum likelihood (ML). 
•  Only the results of the contrast MBS|ERBS are shown. 
•  MBS – Money-Based Stabilization; ERBS – Exchange Rate-Based Stabilization. 
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Table 6: Robustness tests for all observations 
 
MBS/ERBS 1 2 3 4 5 
PCR  -3.07572 
(-2.83)*** 
    
PCR2   -1.38723 
(-1.72)* 
   
QNE     0.128418 
(2.00)** 
  
QLE      -0.277531 
(-2.17)** 
 
ELY       2.03651 
(1.77)* 




























































Log  Likelihood -140.055 -143.183 -140.374 -141.681 -142.183 
Schwarz  B.I.C. 195.269 198.635 195.588 196.895 197.397 
McFadden R
2  0.1640 0.1507 0.1622 0.1543 0.1513 
No. Observations  994  1024  994  994  994 
No.  MBS  6 6 6 6 6 
No.  ERBS  29 29 29 29 29 
Sources: see tables 1 and 3. 
Notes:  
•  t-Statistics are in parentheses;  
•  Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%;  
•  Models estimated with a constant, by maximum likelihood (ML). 
•  Only the results of the contrast MBS|ERBS are shown. 
•  MBS – Money-Based Stabilization; ERBS – Exchange Rate-Based Stabilization. 
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Table 7: Sensitivity analysis using all programs 
 
MBS/ERBS 1 2 3 4 5 







































































Log  Likelihood -70.8709 -77.2347 -79.0078 -73.1952 -74.9964 
Schwarz  B.I.C. 111.062 118.823 120.727 114.514 116.451 
McFadden R
2  0.1869 0.2741 0.2619 0.2451 0.2311 
No.  Observations  152 181 184 175 178 
No.  MBS  6 7 7 6 6 
No.  ERBS  22 28 28 25 25 
Sources: see tables 1 and 3. 
Notes:  
•  t-Statistics are in parentheses;  
•  Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%;  
•  Models estimated with a constant, by maximum likelihood (ML). 
•  Only the results of the contrast MBS|ERBS are shown. 
•  In column 1 Turkey and Israel are excluded from the sample; 
•  In columns 2 and 3 the 1985:3 Bolivian program is classified as a MBS;  
•  In columns 4 and 5 Bolivia is excluded from the sample. 
•  MBS – Money-Based Stabilization; ERBS – Exchange Rate-Based Stabilization. 
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Table 8.A: Timing and choice of the nominal anchor (using only the main programs) 
 
1 2   
MBS/NS ERBS/NS  MBS/ERBS  MBS/NS ERBS/NS  MBS/ERBS 


















    


































































Log Likelihood  -48.9690  -48.8278 
Schwarz B.I.C.  91.8593  91.7181 
McFadden R
2  0.2325 0.2347 
Nr. Observations  213  213 
Nr. MBS  5  5 
Nr. ERBS  10  10 
Sources: see tables 1 and 3. 
Notes:  
•  t-Statistics are in parentheses;  
•  Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%;  
•  Models estimated with a constant, by maximum likelihood (ML). 
•  MBS – Money-Based Stabilization; ERBS – Exchange Rate-Based Stabilization; NS – No 
Stabilization.  
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Table 8.B: Sensitivity analysis (using only the main programs) 
 
MBS/ERBS 1 2 3 4 5 







































































Log  Likelihood -43.5453 -45.3285 -46.9911 -44.9261 -46.6272 
Schwarz  B.I.C. 84.6786 88.2189 89.9933 87.3525 89.1722 
McFadden R
2  0.2436 0.2956 0.2722 0.2503 0.2239 
No.  Observations  171 213 216 201 204 
No.  MBS  5 6 6 5 5 
No.  ERBS  9 9 9 9 9 
Sources: see tables 1 and 3. 
Notes:  
•  t-Statistics are in parentheses;  
•  Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%;  
•  Models estimated with a constant, by maximum likelihood (ML). 
•  Only the results of the contrast MBS|ERBS are shown. 
•  In column 1 Turkey and Israel are excluded from the sample;  
•  In columns 2 and 3 the 1985:3 Bolivian program is classified as a MBS;  
•  In columns 4 and 5 Bolivia is excluded from the sample. 
•  MBS – Money-Based Stabilization; ERBS – Exchange Rate-Based Stabilization. 
 